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the mavericks, who truly have courage, not just on the battlefield but in the halls
of the Pentagon, who value education, who reach out to the other relevant play-
ers in the security environment (non-governmental organizations, UN, elements
of the interagency, sister services, etc), and who clearly articulate the military’s
role in the myriad complex challenges that we face now and in the future.   
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Anthony James Joes’ most recent book on guerrilla warfare is written to
teach the important elements of counterinsurgency to a primarily American audi-
ence.  Joes feels counterinsurgency has been ignored by historians who write
mainly of great battles and who romanticize the exploits of guerrilla leaders while
ignoring the famous commanders of counterinsurgency.  Joes also is concerned
that although America’s military is likely to be involved in future guerrilla style
conflicts, possibly with increasing frequency, American strategists continue to
concentrate on the blitzkrieg-style speed and violence that has come to be known
as the American way of war.  In order to remedy the situation, Joes has written a
well-researched guide to counterinsurgency to show that with an intelligent strat-
egy based on historical lessons  America can fight and win asymmetrical con-
flicts.
As Joes admits, no two conflicts are exactly alike, and he pokes fun at
those Americans who regularly protest “No More Vietnams.”  However, a serious
look at history’s many insurgencies, small wars, and asymmetrical conflicts does
reveal certain truths about the nature of this type of conflict.  The episodes in his-
tory covered by Joes begin with the American War of Independence and end with
a brief epilogue on the current war in Iraq.  Occasionally, Joes travels even far-
ther into the past when he briefly mentions Roman operations in Spain, and “the
brilliant exploits” of Judas Maccabeus against the Syrians.  The most important
truth revealed from history, the one most often forgotten by Americans dazzled
by firepower and speed, is that insurgency and counterinsurgency are political
phenomena, that victory comes through the restoration of peace, and peace comes
from what can best be described as good government.  In order to achieve peace
one must, Joes says, reintegrate into society its disaffected elements through con-
servative military tactics, redressing grievances, making amnesty attractive, and
erecting a legitimate government.  “Its essence is maximum force with minimum
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violence.  Its goal is to destroy the will of the enemy, not their lives, and certain-
ly not the lives of civilians.”
The political goal is to undercut the guerrilla leaders’ relationship to the
ordinary guerilla fighter, and undercutting the guerrilla’s relationship to civil soci-
ety in order to win civil society’s neutrality if not their loyalty.  A guerrilla force
isolated from the population will be easy to pursue and destroy and will starve
from lack of support.    According to his research, Joes says this can be done by
branding the guerrilla leaders as criminals, offering amnesty to the guerrillas who
had no part in their leaders’ criminality, establishing civilian security, and protect-
ing their lives and property both from the criminal guerrillas and from the excess-
es of the counterinsurgents.  Good government, being fair and just in the treat-
ment of civilians, maintaining the rule of law, being responsive to legitimate civil-
ian grievances, and what Joes repeatedly refers to as “rectitude,” are the things
that will divide civil society from the insurgents.  In a way, Joes is arguing that
the counterinsurgents need to be democracy builders.  Joes even mentions that
Che Guevara stated in his writings that guerrillas cannot defeat a democracy nor
even a government that pretends to be a democracy.  Joes recognizes the complex-
ity of such a task, and notes that the patience and restraint needed for such a mis-
sion is in many ways diametrically opposed to the American way of war which
places the emphasis on “maximum violence and swift results,” and just as impor-
tantly the “notoriously impatient American public.” 
This is not to say that firepower and speed have no place in counterinsur-
gency; they most certainly do.  The direct actions against the insurgents Joes dis-
cusses includes committing to the fight “an abundance of well turned out troops”
in an average of ten counterinsurgents to one guerrilla.  He frequently references
the US Marines Small Wars manual which calls for well armed, highly mobile
“flying columns” to hunt down guerrillas in their sanctuaries and pursue them
relentlessly.  Joes also calls for isolating the battle space from outside support;
developing timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence; draining the population
of weapons; and the “rigorous punishment” of criminals found among the guer-
rillas ranks, guerrillas who fail to negotiate when they know their cause is lost,
and civilians who live in government-secured areas but continue to aid the 
insurgents.
In addition to its overall theme as a guide to counterinsurgency, Resisting
Rebellion offers a brief but thorough review of guerrilla strategy, and examines
the causes and political environments that encourage insurgency.  Joes dismisses
several “myths” of guerrilla war.  Guerrillas can be defeated.  Mao did not win
the People’s War, but rather the Kuomintung was destroyed by the Japanese.
American forces in Vietnam had in fact defeated the insurgency when they with-
drew and left the government in Saigon to be defeated by a conventional invasion
from the North.   Guerrillas have lost in Venezuela and Thailand because they
never achieved the support of civil society.  Joes shows that, unlike the false Cold
War belief that insurgencies are primarily fought by Communists, throughout his-
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tory more often than not insurgents have been fueled by religion, no doubt a
reflection of the importance of respecting and understanding Islam in America’s
two ongoing counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Overall, Joes’ Resisting Rebellion is a masterful review of insurgency and
does a great job of arguing for a democratic and sensible strategy of counterin-
surgency.  The fact that Resisting Rebellion is grounded in historical fact, is well
organized and easy to read, and is just under 250 pages makes it even more valu-
able.  It would be just as good a text for students being first introduced to the sub-
ject, as it would be a valuable addition to the library of an academic who has long
studied the subject, as it would be a good read for those to whom Joes has dedi-
cated the work, the warfighters who face the guerrilla where it truly matters. 
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Since Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the profound transatlantic discord
between the United States and most of Europe, it seems popular to predict
NATO’s demise. It has been written that NATO is now irrelevant; that the foreign
policy differences between the United States, France, and Germany renders the
alliance useless; or that the increasing military capabilities gap between the
United States and Europe is a herald for NATO’s collapse. Certainly, a case can
be made for each of these assertions. At the same time, Lawrence S. Kaplan’s new
book provides a challenge to NATO’s most recent skeptics, and encourages read-
ers to have historical respect for NATO’s longevity, given its record of transat-
lantic differences that consistently plagued the alliance during the Cold War. 
As the author of two previous books on NATO and arguably its foremost
historian, Kaplan chronicles the history of NATO’s internal problems, beginning
with the negotiations over Article 5, NATO’s collective defense agreement, up to
the present differences over Iraq. The majority of the book focuses, however, on
Cold War debates. Kaplan is not attempting to unearth new historical data on
NATO, but rather is attempting to highlight NATO’s complicated history, while
implicitly demonstrating its ability to survive. 
Among the historical clashes that Kaplan addresses are the differences
between the United States and Europe over the rearmament of Germany after the
Second World War, the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, the United States’ decision to
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